ABSTRACT Privacy security issues under the classic randomized response (RR) model proposed by Warner and its extended K -RR model are studied. First, in order to provide references for the accuracy of the private distribution estimation problem under RR mechanism, the lower bounds of the differential privacy parameter and the number of participates are deduced for an accuracy objective of (α, δ)-accurate in statistics. Second, when the prior distribution is nonuniform, the data utility has a ceiling effect in the high privacy region by taking the prior into account. In this case, the average distortion, which is defined as the expected Hamming distance between the input and output data, is no longer feasible to measure the data utility. Motivated by this, the error probability is proposed as a measure of data utility for unifying different privacy metrics, where the error probability is defined to be the expected Hamming distance between the input and reconstructed data based on maximum a posteriori estimation. Third, under a unified privacy-preserving framework using RR mechanism based on error probability criterion, the relationship among differential privacy, identifiability privacy, and mutual information privacy is established. Given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , the optimal privacy parameters of these three privacy notions are derived with the full consideration of the prior distribution. Then, a Bayes-based utility function, which corresponds to the converse of the Bayes risk, is constructed to measure the degree of privacy leakage. Given a maximum allowable correct probability P max C , the accuracy objective of the statistical estimate is considered to derive the range of local differential privacy parameter from the perspective of security. Fourth, all the research results above are further extended to K -RR mechanism too. Finally, the correctness and effectiveness are further verified by simulation experiments. The results reveal that the error probability can be applied to any prior distribution case, while the average distortion criterion is only a special case with uniform distribution. Therefore, the error probability proposed in the paper is more reasonable to be used as a common criterion to measure the data utility for the RR model so as to unify different privacy metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomized response (RR) technology, which weakens the assumption that the data collector is completely trustworthy and has received extensive attention (e.g., [1] - [7] ), is the prevalent perturbation mechanism for local privacy preservation and has been proven to perform well in the statistical area. In 1965, Warner first proposed the classical RR technique as a means to eliminate bias in the collection of sensitive data. Based on Warner's RR model, the randomized perturbation was modeled as the transmission process of discrete memoryless channels and meanwhile, the binary symmetric transfer probability matrix with the optimal differential privacy mechanism was given from the perspective of minimizing the estimate error (e.g., [4] , [5] , [8] ). In addition, some researchers have extended it to the case of the multiinput discrete source, and proposed the K -ary randomized response (extended K -RR) model [3] . The privacy preservation problems of the classic RR model and extended K -RR model are both explored in this paper.
So far, there are three main local privacy metrics for RR mechanism: differential privacy [9] - [11] , identifiability privacy [12] and mutual information privacy [13] - [24] . Among them, differential privacy, which does not depend on the prior distribution of the original private data, is a recognized privacy metric based on the distortion. It has been widely used as the basis for privacy-preserving data analysis since its introduction in 2006 (e.g., [9] - [11] ). Identifiability privacy, which does depend on the posterior probability, is used to measure the relative accuracy of right guessing the private data given the prior and the output [12] . In this case, the posterior probability can be deduced from the observation of the output data based on the Bayesian theory. Since the identifiability privacy metric implies the prior information, it characterizes an absolute guarantee for privacy disclosure. For instance, when considering an original private data X with a single binary entry, i.e., X ∈ {0, 1}, if the prior is given by P X (1) = 0.9 and P X (0) = 0.1, the adversary is able to identify X with probability 0.9 using the prior information regardless of any privacy-preserving mechanism, because higher identifiability level leads to a higher risk of privacy disclosure. Information-theoretic privacy measures including mutual information, information entropy, conditional entropy, min-entropy, etc, are relatively classical and have a rich history (e.g., [4] , [13] - [24] ), where mutual information privacy depicts the overall or average privacy leakage. Obviously, these three different privacy metrics measure the privacy-preserving level form different perspectives, and can only qualitatively measure the privacy-preserving level from the privacy parameters, in which the privacy parameters reflect the data utility to some extent, but do not assist in quantitative analysis for the privacy-preserving level or the data utility. In addition, if different privacy metrics are measured by different data utility criteria, the privacy-preserving mechanisms under different parameter settings are difficult to make a direct comparison with each other. Therefore, how to find a common criterion to measure the data utility, unify the above three different privacy metrics, and then explore the privacy security issues, is a challenging problem.
To address the above challenge, the (average) distortion based on the celebrated rate-distortion theory [25] was proposed as a measure of data utility for binary private data using RR mechanism. The distortion metric is currently the mainstream general metric. Using the distortion as a common criterion, many research works have explored the privacy security issues (e.g., [4] , [20] - [24] ), where the average distortion described as D is defined to be the expected Hamming distance between the input and output data. It is considered that the distortion is inversely correlated with data utility, i.e., the larger the distortion, the lower the data utility. Moreover, it is also considered that larger distortion represents a higher privacy-preserving level. From the perspective of the privacy-distortion, given a maximum allowable distortion D, the relationship between the three privacy metrics of differential privacy, identifiability privacy and mutual information privacy was first dissected based on a common distortion criterion throughout the literature [20] , and the optimal tradeoff between privacy and distortion was also explored at the same time. However, the domain of D in [20] was discussed in the domain of D ∈ (0, n), where n denotes the number of rows or entries in the database. To our best knowledge, the domain of D should be (0, D max ), where D max is the upper bound of D. When the distribution of the input private data is nonuniform, the upper bound of D satisfies the constrained condition D max < n rather than D max = n. Thus, the distortion served as a common criterion to measure the data utility takes away from its reasonability. As we know from the rate-distortion theory, the average distortion D is closely related to the prior. When and only when the prior distribution is uniform, the upper bound of D satisfies D max = n such that the discussion in [20] may be more reasonable in the domain D ∈ (0, n). Hence, the discussion of privacy parameters based on the distortion D would be more reasonable within the domain (0, D max ) when taking full consideration of any prior. In other words, privacy parameters based on the common criterion should be studied by taking into account the prior with any distribution, and then be derived within its real domain so that the theoretical analysis is more meaningful for practical applications. Moreover, using the distortion between the input and output data to measure the data utility for RR model is not very reasonable. Taking Warner's RR model as an example, for the private data with binary source, when the private bit is flipped with probability ''1'' by the transmission channel, i.e., the channel's error probability is ''1'', the distortion (or Hamming distance) between the input and output data is the largest while the data utility is the highest but the privacy-preserving level is the lowest at this moment. This is because the original private data can be perfectly reconstructed by flipping the output bits. As a result, the distortion and the data utility do not present negative relativity in this special case, which is not consistent with the consideration mentioned above. Therefore, the average distortion, which served as a common criterion to unify different privacy metrics, has some inherent limitations.
Heretofore, some researcher works had been proposed to reconstruct the private sources using maximum a posteriori (MAP) criterion from the perspective of information theory for RR mechanism (e.g., [16] - [19] , [21] ). As we all know, MAP criterion is a well-known criterion for minimizing the error probability of the reconstructed data. Meanwhile, the error probability based on MAP can reflect the data utility intuitively. In other words, larger error probability corresponds to a lower data utility but a higher degree of privacy preservation. This inherent relationship between error probability and utility can be applied in any cases. Taking a forward-looking view, the error probability based on MAP rather than the distortion is more reasonable to be used as the measure of data utility. Then, the error probability will be served as a common criterion to unify the three different privacy metrics mentioned above in our paper. Throughout the paper, Warner's classic RR model and its extended K -RR model are discussed by considering the effect of both privacy and utility. Theoretical analysis shows that in the special case where the prior distribution is uniform, the error probability and the average distortion are formally equivalent. In other words, the average distortion can be regarded as a special case of the error probability. In real-word applications, the determination of differential privacy parameters is an inevitable question for the local privacy preservation technology based on RR. Therefore, the discussion and exploration of privacy parameter settings in this paper provide a strong theoretical guidance for privacy preservation in actual data collection based on RR. The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• By using statistics, for binary private sources, when the statistical estimate satisfies the desired objective of (α, δ)-accurate, the lower bounds of differential privacy parameter ε and the number of participates n are derived, which have been further extended to K -RR mechanism;
• In the case where the prior is perfect known and taken into account, the MAP criterion is used to reconstruct the original private data, and then the error probability served as a common criterion is used to measure the data utility for unifying the three different privacy metrics. For binary private sources, given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , i.e., the maximum Bayes risk is P max E , the lower bounds of differential privacy, identifiability privacy and mutual information privacy are derived, which have been further extended to K -RR mechanism;
• In the case where the prior is perfect known and taken into account, a Bayes-based utility function that corresponds to the converse of the Bayes risk is constructed to measure the degree of privacy leakage. For binary private sources, considering the effect on both the accuracy of statistics and the security of the private data, the range of differential privacy parameter ε is derived to achieve the objective of (α, δ)-accurate for a given maximum allowable correct probability P max C , i.e., the maximum allowable privacy leakage is set to P max C , which have been further extended to K -RR mechanism. The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: In Section II, for binary private sources, the local privacy preservation system model based on RR is given, and then (α, δ)-accurate and the error probability based on MAP criterion are investigated. In Section III, the three main privacy metrics using the error probability as a common criterion are discussed in detail, and the differential privacy parameter is also analyzed from the perspective of security. After that, in Section IV, all theoretical analyses above are extended to K -RR model. The simulation analysis is given to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the theoretical derivation in Section V. Finally, Section VI will provide conclusions and outline future work directions.
II. LOCAL PRIVACY PRESERVATION SYSTEM MODEL BASED ON RR MECHANISM A. BINARY PRIVACY CHANNELS MODELING
For binary private source X ∈ D (D = {0, 1} and |D| = 2), the classic RR model [1] is used here, in which the RR process is modeled as the transmission process of the binary symmetric channels, as shown in Fig. 1 . Here, n denotes the number of participants or the sample size, Y ∈ D is the output data, and 1 − θ denotes the error transmission probability of the channel. For the private distribution estimate problem, the RR mechanism satisfies the constraint imposed by the optimal ε-differential privacy from the perspective of minimizing the estimate error when θ = e ε /(1 + e ε ). Then, the optimal RR mechanism can be described by the following 2 × 2 row-stochastic matrix [4] , [5] , [8] 
e ε (1) FIGURE 1. RR-based binary privacy channels modeling and its local privacy preservation mechanism, where x i ∈ {0, 1} denotes the i 'th private data, y i ∈ {0, 1} denotes the i 'th collected data (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}), and each randomized response is independent from any other.
where ε ≥ 0 is also called the local differential privacy (LDP) parameter or privacy budget, and its specific definition will be given later. For convenience, throughout this paper we will use the channel transfer matrix Q Y |X in (1) to distort the original private data for binary RR mechanism, and will not describe them one by one. The input and the output distribution are given by P X = [P X (0), P X (1)] and P Y = [P Y (0), P Y (1)], respectively, where P X (x), P Y (y) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of X = x ∈ D and Y = y ∈ D, respectively, |D|−1 x=0 P X (x) = 1 and |D|−1 y=0 P Y (y) = 1. Obviously, P X and P Y satisfy P Y = P X Q Y |X , and then the empirical estimateP X under Q Y |X is calculated asP 
where the channel transfer probability for the private sequence of length n is given by
where x n ∈ X n , y n ∈ Y n , X n , Y n ∈ D n , and d H (x n , y n ) denotes the Hamming distance between two sequences x n , y n .
In the basic model, each input X i ∈ D (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) is assumed to be an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random sample and is treated uniformly. We are interested in learning the proportion of 1's in [26] .
Definition 1 ((α, δ)-Accurate): For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, an empirical estimatep of p is (α, δ)-accurate if p − p ≥ α holds the probability at most δ, that is
where Pr (·) denotes the probability. In practical applications, a 95% confidence interval is typically used [27] , i.e., δ = 0.05. Using Chebyshev's inequality, the margin of error of a sample can be calculated as α = √ 20σ 2 indicating that the privacy preservation mechanism satisfies ( √ 20σ 2 , 0.05)-accurate, where the variance σ 2 is given by
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Theorem 1: For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, given a desired differential privacy parameter ε, the optimal RR mechanism (Q Y |X ) based on differential privacy is used. If the number of participates n satisfies n ≥ e ε α 2 δ(e ε − 1) 2 (5) then the estimatep 1 of p 1 is (α, δ)-accurate for binary private sources, where · denotes round up operation.
From Theorem 1, for any given α and δ, we can see that the lower bound of n is a decreasing function of ε (ε > 0). In other words, the larger the parameter ε is, the smaller the number of participates n is required for a given (α, δ)-accurate.
Theorem 2:
For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, given the number of participates n, the optimal RR mechanism (Q Y |X ) based on differential privacy is used. If the differential privacy parameter ε satisfies
then the estimatep 1 of p 1 is (α, δ)-accurate for binary private sources. The proofs for theorems 1 and 2 are given in Appendix A. From Theorem 2, it can be learned that the smaller the number of participates n, the larger ε is required for a given (α, δ)-accurate. However, larger parameter ε represents a lower degree of privacy preservation. In other words, when n is insufficient, the power of the noise added to the channel should be set to a relatively small value at the cost of reducing the degree of privacy preservation. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a good tradeoff between the number of participates n and the degree of privacy preservation for actual situations.
In practice, although the prior distribution is generally unknown, a relatively accurate posteriori estimate can be obtained through statistical analysis or data mining when the number of participates n→∞, and then a relatively accurate prior estimate can be obtained. In the following it can be reasonably assumed that the individual's private data is unknown, but its prior distribution is known to lie in a known set P X .
B. ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS BASED ON MAP 1) BINARY CHANNELS WITH HAMMING DISTORTION
For any input x n and output y n , the Hamming distortion between x n and y n is
where x n ∈ X n , y n ∈ Y n , x i , y i are the i-th input private data and the i-th output data, respectively, and d H (x i , y i ) denotes the Hamming distance between two symbols x i , y i ∈ D.
According to the rate-distortion theory, the average distortion between two sequences x n , y n is given bȳ
where E[·] denotes the expectation operation.
2) ERROR PROBABILITY BASED ON MAP
In the light of information theory, a special case of the reconstruction rule is that the output is reconstructed by ''1'' VOLUME 7, 2019 (or ''0'') when the output data is ''1'' (or ''0''). Then the (average) error probability of the reconstructed data is formally equivalent to the average (Hamming) distortion between the input private data and the reconstructed data. As a result, d H in (8) can also be called the error probability. Since the prior distribution P X is assumed to be known, the corresponding posterior probability Q X |Y can be obtained by Q Y |X . Given the condition of Y = y, the reconstructed function F(y) =x is selected based on MAP criterion or minimum error probability criterion, in which the reconstructed datax is given byx
then the error probability based on MAP is calculated as
wherex n denotes the reconstructed data sequence, d H x n ,x n denotes the Hamming distortion betweenx n and x n , X \x represents all other elements in X exceptx, and the joint probability distribution Q XY (xy) is calculated by
. By using Bayesian theory, (10a) can be further described as
It can be seen that the error probability P E , which is also called the Bayes risk, is a function of the prior P X . It implies that a posterior probability of a wrong guess based on MAP is P E . Then, if and only if the prior is uniform, (10) can be expressed as
Observing that in the case where the input data is uniform, we have that P E ≡d H , i.e., the error probability is formally equivalent to the average distortion in (8) . Therefore, the average distortion can be regarded as a special case of the error probability. In other words, the error probability should be more reasonable to measure the data utility so as to be acted as a common criterion to unify different privacy metrics.
Given the prior P X = [p 0 , p 1 ] and Q Y |X , the specific expression of the error probability in (10) can be further rewritten as
where p min = min {p 0 , p 1 }. Obviously, the equation (12a) is equivalent to (12b)
The reconstructed error probability satisfies P E ≤ p min . Here, p max , p max satisfy 0 < p min ≤ 0.5 ≤ p max < 1 for binary private sources. Definition 2 (Parameter ε X ): The prior distribution of the input private data X is given by P X = {P X (x)} with |D|−1 x=0 P X (x) = 1. Then, the parameter ε X is defined as
which is the maximum prior probability difference between two different entries. Given the prior P X , the parameter ε X ≥ 0 is determined only by P X , and it is a constant. On the other hand, the parameter ε X , which is negatively correlated with degree of uniformity, is usually used to measure the uniformity of the input distribution. For binary data, we have that
When the input is uniform, i.e., p 0 = p 1 = 0.5, ε X is equal to zero. For any prior P X , recalling the mechanism Q Y |X , the error probability in (12) can be also expressed as
where P E ≡d H when ε ≥ ε X . It can be observed that P E satisfies P E ≥ 1 (1 + e ε ) when ε ≥ 0, where the equality holds if and only if the input data is uniform or ε ≥ ε X .
III. PRIVACY PARAMETERS ANALYSIS UNDER A COMMON CRITERION BASED ON ERROR PROBABILITY
In this section, the MAP-based error probability will be used to measure the data utility, and then used as a common criterion to analyze and explore the optimal privacy parameters of the three privacy metrics: differential privacy, identifiability privacy and mutual information privacy. Next, the LDP parameter is further analyzed from the perspective of privacy security.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE PRIVACY METRICS 1) LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY METRIC
Definition 3: (ε DP -Local Differential Privacy) The privacy preservation mechanism Q Y |X satisfies ε DP -local differential privacy, where ε DP is defined as
which is the maximum transfer probability difference between two different entries given Q Y |X . In other words, differential privacy is concerned with additional disclosures of a participant's private data due to the data release. Note that LDP is only determined by Q Y |X and does not depend on the prior. For binary private sources, recalling Q Y |X , the equation above can be further derived as
which reflects the degree of privacy preservation. It can be learned that ε DP = ε when using Q Y |X in (1). For simplicity, we may describe ε DP -local differential privacy as ε-differential privacy below. Note that LDP intuitively reflects the size of the power of the noise added to the noisy channel: the smaller the parameter ε, the larger the power of the noise. It can be observed that the larger the differential privacy parameter ε, the smaller the channel transfer probability 1/(1 + e ε ), which means that the less the noise added to the noisy channel, the lower the degree of privacy preservation. On the contrary, smaller ε corresponds to a higher degree of privacy preservation, but a relatively lower data utility. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a tradeoff between differential privacy and data utility. The relationship between (local) differential privacy and the error probability using classical Warner's RR mechanism Q Y |X for five different prior distributions, where the error probability curve is coincident with that of the average distortion when P X = [0.5 0.5].
Fig . 2 shows the error probability curves with respect to ε for five different binary discrete prior distributions, and gives the average distortion curve for ease of comparison studies. It can be observed that the average distortiond H is a monotonically decreasing and continuous function with ε ≥ 0. Moreover, when the input data X is uniform, the error probability curve is coincident with that of the average distortion, i.e., P E ≡d H (ε X ≡ 0). In this case, both criteria are suitable for measuring the data utility. On the other hand, when the prior is nonuniform, the trend of the error probability curves can be divided into two stages: high privacy region with 0 ≤ ε < ε X and relatively low privacy region with ε ≥ ε X . For the first stage with 0 ≤ ε < ε X , the error probability P E maintains a constant value p min for a given prior, which indicates that the data utility has a ceiling effect in the high privacy region. For the second stage with ε ≥ ε X , the error probability is a monotonically decreasing function with P E =d H , i.e., the error probability and the average distortion are formally equivalent.
Theoretically, when the parameter ε increases from 0 to ε X for the first stage with a nonuniform distribution, the power of the noise added to the noisy channel becomes smaller and smaller, such that the degree of privacy preservation is decreasing gradually from the point of differential privacy, thereby obtaining an increasing data utility from the perspective of the average distortion. However, the data utility has a ceiling effect in the high privacy region with 0 ≤ ε < ε X from the point view of the error probability, in which the error probability maintains constant. This is because the power of the noise added to the noisy channel is relatively large in the high privacy region, leading to the interpretation that there is no help for reconstructing the original private data by observing the output data Y . As thus, the prior plays a leading role in the reconstruction of the original data. For the second stage of relatively low privacy region with ε ≥ ε X , differential privacy can better measure the degree of privacy preservation, and both the differential privacy and the error probability criteria can measure the data utility. Meanwhile, the noise added to the noisy channel is comparatively small, such that the channel transfer characteristic plays a leading role in the reconstruction. Therefore, using the average distortion to measure the data utility is just a special case of the error probability proposed in this paper. This is because MAP-base error probability criterion can apply any prior distribution. Besides, the error probability is equivalent to the average distortion if and only if the prior is uniform when ε ≥ 0, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis above.
In conclusion, we convince that the average distortion is no longer feasible to measure the data utility when the prior is nonuniform, because the data utility has a ceiling effect in the high privacy region. Hence, the error probability, which is used to measure the data utility, is very reasonable to be served as a common criterion to unify different privacy metrics compared with the average distortion.
In the case where the prior is known, the error probability criterion which reflects the degree of privacy preservation for RR mechanism can better measure the data utility. Moreover, this metric is particularly suitable for releasing the discrete sources. In this case, larger error probability leads to lower data utility, but if so that would achieve a higher degree of privacy preservation. In practice, data utility can be controlled by adjusting the parameter ε to achieve a tradeoff between privacy and utility. Therefore, given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , i.e., the maximum allowable Bayes VOLUME 7, 2019 risk is P max E , the differential privacy satisfies
where P max E satisfies 0 ≤ P max E < p min = 1 − p max for binary private sources. The optimal differential privacy parameter is given by
2) IDENTIFIABILITY PRIVACY METRIC
From Definition 3, differential privacy is only related to the channel transfer probability and does not depend on the prior. The attacker can correctly guess the private data with a probability not less than p max regardless of the mechanism with any ε-differential privacy if he or she knows the prior. Therefore, differential privacy just provides a relative guarantee about the privacy disclosure. However, identifiability privacy requires an absolute guarantee about the privacy disclosure, which is described below.
Definition 4 (ε IP -Identifiability Privacy):
The prior P X and the RR mechanism Q Y |X are assumed to be known, and then the identifiability privacy parameter ε IP is defined by
which is the maximum difference of posterior probabilities between two different entries from a Bayesian view. It can be observed that ε IP -identifiability privacy is defined based on the indistinguishability between the posterior probabilities of two entries given P X and Q Y |X . Note that the notion of identifiability privacy measures the hardness of identifying the private data rather than identifying the individual who is in the database. Intuitively, identifiability privacy in (18a) and LDP in (15a) are similar in expression, but the difference is that the former does depend on the posterior, while the later does depend on the channel transfer probability Q Y |X . Hence ε IP -identifiability privacy is also called posterior differential privacy. When ε IP is relatively small, the probability of identifying the private data is limited, and thus no much privacy disclosure can occur. For binary private sources, given the prior P X = [p 0 , p 1 ] and the mechanism Q Y |X , ε IP in (18a) can be further derived as
As we can see from (18b), there is only a constant parameter difference between identifiability privacy and LDP for a given prior. Note that ε X is a constant determined only by the prior distribution from Definition 2. When the input is uniform, we have that ε IP = ε DP = ε with ε X = 0, i.e., identifiability privacy is equivalent to the case of LDP. On the other hand, given the prior, ε IP is a linear increasing function of ε and satisfies ε IP = ε + ε X with ε IP ≥ ε X . In this case, the probability of right identifying the private data X is still no greater than e ε IP /(1 + e ε IP ) by observing the output data Y . In addition, larger ε IP represents a lower degree of privacy preservation but higher risk of privacy breach. For ε IP , the smaller the better from the perspective of privacy preservation, but this will lead to a decrease in the data utility, hence it is necessary to seek a tradeoff between them. As a result, a tradeoff between identifiability privacy and utility is equivalent to a tradeoff between differential privacy and utility. For binary private sources, Fig. 3 shows the relationship between differential privacy and identifiability privacy for five different prior distributions. From top to down, ε X is ln(0.9/0.1) = 2.1972, ln(0.8/0.2) = 1.3863, ln(0.7/0.3) = 0.8473, ln(0.6/0.4) = 0.4055 and ln(0.5/0.5) = 0, respectively. It can be observed that identifiability privacy and differential privacy are linearly related. Besides, when the prior is uniform, we have that ε IP = ε with ε X = 0 for ε ≥ 0, which is consistent with the previous analysis.
Similarly, given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , the minimum identifiability privacy while guaranteeing the highest degree of privacy preservation is given by
where ε DP = ε * .
3) MUTUAL INFORMATION PRIVACY METRIC

Definition 5 (Mutual Information Privacy):
For the input X and the output Y , if the mutual information privacy between X and Y satisfies I (X ; Y ) ≤ ε (ε ≥ 0), the RR mechanism is ε-mutual information privacy, where I (X ; Y ) is given by
Note that the notion of mutual information privacy is an information-theoretic notion of privacy. Moreover, mutual information privacy measures the average amount of information about X contained in Y . The mutual information privacy can be utilized to characterize the overall or average privacy leakage for RR mechanism. If privacy preservation mechanism satisfies I (X ; Y ) ≡ 0, it means that the privacy preservation mechanism is secure for the original private data X , i.e., X can be completely preserved. Meanwhile, since the error probability of the channel satisfies 0 ≤ 1/(1 + e ε ) ≤ 0.5, the mutual information is an increasing function of ε (ε ≥ 0) for a giving prior. For any prior P X , when the classic RR mechanism with Q Y |X is adopted, the maximum privacy leakage risk ML based on information theory can be described as For binary private sources, Fig. 4 plots mutual information as a function of ε for five different prior distributions. The increasing trend is consistent with the previous discussion. The larger ε, the smaller power of the noise added to the noisy channel and the larger mutual information, but this would lead to a higher privacy leakage risk. In addition, the privacy leakage risk reaches its maximum when the prior is uniform. Therefore, smaller value for mutual information privacy metric represents lower data utility but a higher degree of privacy preservation, so that it is necessary to seek a tradeoff between them. Since mutual information is a monotonous increasing function of ε, a tradeoff between mutual information privacy and utility is similar to that between differential privacy and utility.
Given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , the optimal mutual information privacy is given by
which satisfies ε * -(local) differential privacy, and H (·) denotes information entropy defined by
To summarize, in the point of tradeoff between privacy and utility, identifiability and mutual information privacy are similar to differential privacy from (15b) (16b) and (22) . Hence, the analysis below will only be performed for differential privacy.
B. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY PARAMETER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY
According to the utility function in Bayesian theory [28] , the correct probability estimated by MAP estimation can directly reflect the security of the private data as well as the privacy leakage: larger correct probability represents a higher level of privacy leakage. Here, the correct probability corresponds to the converse of the Bayes risk or the error probability. Since P E , P C satisfy P E + P C =1, the correct probability based on MAP is given by
It can be observed that P E and P C are both functions of the prior P X . Besides, P C satisfies P C = e ε /(1 + e ε ) (ε ≥ 0) when using Q Y |X , where the equality holds if and only if the prior is uniform or ε ≥ ε X . During the investigation (or the data release), if the purpose of the data collection is only aimed to obtain a relatively accurate statistical characteristics for a certain level of security, we should consider the effect on both the accuracy of statistics and the security of the private data. Therefore, this section will explore the case that the RR mechanism achieves the statistical objective of (α, δ)-accurate for a given maximum allowable correct probability P max C . That is, the maximum allowable privacy leakage risk is set to P max C . For binary discrete symmetric channels, differential privacy parameter satisfies
(24a) VOLUME 7, 2019 Note that if the prior is uniform or P max C satisfies the inequality P max C ≥ e ε X /(1 + e ε X ). Recalling Theorem 2, the above equation can be further described as
In practice, the range of ε is related to the specific requirements of both the maximum allowable privacy leakage level and the accuracy objective of statistical results for a given n. When P max C satisfies the inequality P max C ≥ 1/ √ 4nα 2 δ + 1, the specific range of ε is given by
Clearly, smaller ε corresponds to a higher degree of privacy preservation or lower risk of privacy leakage. In practice, it is necessary to take into account the requirements of both privacy preservation and accuracy to determine the optimal differential privacy parameter ε in RR mechanism. From the perspective of maximizing the degree of privacy preservation, if the data collection using RR mechanism aims that the statistical estimate satisfies the objective of (α, δ)-accurate while guaranteeing the lowest risk of privacy leakage, then the optimal differential privacy parameterε * is given bỹ
Note that the equation (26) should satisfy the constraint
Here, the identifiability privacy is at a lowest level, and an optimal mutual information privacy is achieved. Then the total number of participates n should satisfy n ≥ eε * /α 2 δ(eε * − 1) 2 .
IV. EXTENDED K -RR MECHANISM MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY PARAMETERS A. K -ARY MODELING BASED ON K -RR
For K -ary discrete symmetric private sources, the transfer probability between X and Y is given as follows using the extended K -RR mechanism [3] :
where X , Y ∈ D, D = {0, 1, . . . , K − 1}, and |D| = K ≥ 2. We find that the local privacy preservation mechanism using K -RR responds to its true value with probability e ε / (K − 1 + e ε ), and responds to each of the remaining K − 1 values with probability 1/(K − 1 + e ε ). From Definition 3, it can be learned that the extended K -RR mechanism in (27) satisfies ε-(local) differential privacy. Note that (27) is equivalent to (1) when K =2, hence the extended K -RR in (27) is a more generalized definition. Similarly, the inverse matrix
Similarly, when the number of participants is larger enough, it is almost surely thatP X → P X . Therefore, without loss of generality, the discussion of the extended K -RR mechanism still assumes that the prior distribution is known to lie in a known set, and the specific private data is unknown. The transfer probability from X n to Y n for K -RR mechanism is given by
where x n ∈ X n , y n ∈ Y n and X n , Y n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} n . Similarly, each input data for K -RR is i.i.d. and is treated uniformly. The proportion of x's in
which states that # (x i = x) ∈ {0, 1}. Letp x be the empirical estimate of p x . Corollary 1: For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, given the differential privacy parameter ε, the extended K -RR mechanism in (27) based on differential privacy is used. If the number of participates n satisfies
then the empirical estimatep x of p x is (α, δ)-accurate, where K denotes the number of values or categories of statistical samples during the investigation. Please find the proof in Appendix A.
From Corollary 1, it can be learned that the larger the value K is, the larger the number of participates n is required for a desired (α, δ)-accurate. For K -RR mechanism, let p max (30) is the largest when p x = p max K for a desired accuracy, but the required n at this time can meet the requirements of (α, δ)-accurate for all empirical estimates.
Corollary 2: For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, given the number of participates n, the extended K -RR mechanism in (27) based on differential privacy is used. If the differential privacy parameters ε satisfies
then the empirical estimatep x of p x satisfies (α, δ)-accurate. The proof is also provided in Appendix A. From Corollary 2, it can be learned that the lower bound of ε for the purpose of the empirical estimatep x satisfying a desired (α, δ)-accurate is related to its true probability p x , where the lower bound of ε is also called the optimal differential privacy parameter. When p x = p max K , the lower bound of ε is the largest. For simplicity, we denote the optimal but largest lower bound of ε as ε *
Although the privacy preservation level is relatively low when ε = ε * K , the value of ε enables the estimatep x of each p x to satisfy (α, δ)-accurate (x ∈ D). In practice, the accuracy of the estimate should be determined by the actual demand of privacy preservation.
B. ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS BASED ON MAP
Clearly, the setup from the binary case can be generalized straightforwardly to the case of Hamming distortion for general K -ary discrete sources. The average distortion between X and Y for K -RR model is given bȳ
Similarly, the special case of the reconstruction rule is that when the observed output is ''i'' (i ∈ D), the input is reconstructed by ''i'', and thusd H in (32) can be also called the error probability. Given the output Y = y, the error probability based on MAP for K -RR model is the same as (10) , and the only difference is that X , Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} rather than X , Y ∈ {0, 1}. If the prior is uniform, the error probability of K -RR is given by
and then we have P E =d H , i.e., the error probability is formally equivalent to the average distortion in (32) for any ε ≥ 0 if and only if the prior is uniform. The notation p max K can be also described as p max
Given the prior, we can calculate ε X = ln(p max K /p min K ) by Definition 2. For K -RR mechanism, the error probability satisfies the constrained condition that P E ≤ (K − 1)/(K − 1+e ε ) =d H , where the equality holds if and only if the input is uniform or ε ≥ ε X .
C. ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY PARAMETERS BASED ON THE COMMON CRITERION OF ERROR PROBABILITY
For K -RR model, the definitions 1 to 5 above are also applicable, and the only difference is that X , Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} rather than X , Y ∈ {0, 1}. According to Definition 4, identifiability privacy and local differential privacy still satisfy ε IP = ε DP + ε X with ε DP = ε. From the view of information theory, the maximum privacy leakage risk is given by 5 . Illustration of the characterizations of the error probability, the average distortion and the mutual information for K -RR model under four different distributions when K = 4, where the error probability curve is coincident with that of the average distortion when the prior is uniform, i. probability is neither strictly maintaining constant nor strictly decreasing for some prior distributions when 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε X , leading to the fact that the data utility is not strictly improved in terms of the error probability. However, the power of the noise added to the noisy channel is relatively large when 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε X , leading to the similar fact that the prior still dominates the reconstruction of the original private data for K -RR mechanism. Therefore, the error probability is a better measure for data utility and then is used as a common criterion to unify different privacy metrics.
For K -RR mechanism, given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , the optimal differential privacy parameter satisfies
When the prior is uniform or the maximum allowable error probability satisfies 0 ≤ P max
, the optimal differential privacy parameter satisfies
where ε * K ≥ ε X . If and only if P max E satisfies the constrained condition that 0 ≤ P max
grows logarithmically in the domain size K , which is similar to the form of Conjecture 1 in [4] . This is because the error probability and the average distortion are formally equivalent when ε K ≥ ε X , which is consistent with the analysis above.
For K -RR model, the minimum identifiability privacy also satisfies ε * IP = ε * K +ε X . Then, the best mutual information privacy is given by
By Q Y |X in (27), the equation above can be further expressed as
Since (37b) is the same as (24b) when K = 2, it is a more general expression. The entropy function is defined as
For K -RR model, P E + P C = 1, and the expression of P C based on MAP is still the equation (23) with X , Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} rather than X , Y ∈ {0, 1}. If the prior distribution is uniform, the correct probability of K -RR is given by
which is also a function of the prior P X . Besides, P C satisfies P C ≥ e ε /(K − 1 + e ε ), where the equality holds if and only if the prior is uniform or ε ≥ ε X . For K -RR mechanism, given a maximum allowable correct probability P max C , if the empirical estimatep x of p x for all x ∈ D satisfies (α, δ)-accurate, the differential privacy parameter is given by
We know that the optimal and largest lower bound of ε denotes as ε *
To make the empirical estimatep x satisfy the objective of (α, δ)-accurate while guaranteeing the lowest degree of privacy disclosure for all p x with any x ∈ D, the best differential privacy parameter is ε * K for any x ∈ D. In this case, we will obtain the lowest identifiability level and the optimal mutual information privacy. Then the number of participates n satisfies
Note that the required n in (41) can achieve (α, δ)-accurate for each p x with any x ∈ D.
V. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
From theories 1 and 2 (or corollaries 1 and 2), given the prior distribution P X , the local differential privacy preservation based on RR model (LDPP-RR) has certain requirements for the sample size n and the parameter ε, which are two important factors affecting the quality of the statistical data. For simplicity, this section mainly analyzes the experimental characteristics for binary private sources using classical Warner's RR mechanism, i.e., K = 2. In the following, we will analyze the statistical quality of LDPP-RR by using the classical statistical methods.
According to the statistics, hepatitis B virus carriers account for about 10% of the total number of people in China. Let ''1'' or ''0'' represents the case that the respondent is or not a hepatitis B virus carrier. As a result, the prior of ''0'' and ''1'' is given by
During the investigation, whether the respondent is a hepatitis B virus carrier or not is personally sensitive information. In order to simulate the influence of the sample size n on the quality of statistics, the simulation experiment sets up four orders of magnitude for the sample sizes: 10 2 , 10 3 , 10 4 and 10 5 . Here, we use MATLAB software to simulate the process of RR with a binary symmetric channel, in which the original private data is generated randomly with a known prior for each Monte Carlo simulation. Note that, the degree of privacy preservation is determined by differential privacy parameter ε, where ε controls the degree of perturbation by controlling its true prior probability of output data based on RR, thereby protecting the privacy of the respondent. To simulate the impact of ε on the degree of privacy preservation, we set four values with ε = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0. 6 shows the simulation probabilities ofp 1 − p 1 , and the number of Monte Carlo simulations is set to 10 5 . Note that the simulation probability of p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 is close to zero when ε = 0.5 and n = 10 5 as well as the case of ε = 1.0, n = 10 4 / ε = 1.0, n = 10 5 / ε = 2.0, n = 10 4 / ε = 2.0, n = 10 5 . It can be observed that: (1) Given ε (such as ε = 0.1), the probability of p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 decreases dramatically as the sample size n increases, i.e., the quality of statistics is constantly improving when the sample size n gets larger for a given ε. At the same time, when n increases to a certain extent (such as n = 10 5 , ε = 2.0), p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 holds almost the probability 0. In other words, the empirical estimates of the 10 5 simulation experiments are almost identical to the true probability when n is large enough, indicating that the statistical quality of the data collected by the investigator or the collector is adequately high at this time; (2) Given the sample size n, the probability of p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 decreases with the increase of ε, indicating that the quality of statistics is continuously increasing with the increase of ε. Meanwhile, when ε increases to a certain extent, a very high quality of statistics will be achieved. But there will be a higher risk of privacy breach at the same time. In summary, increasing n can improve the quality of statistics for a given ε; increasing ε can also improve the quality of statistics for a given n. These are two different forms of the same thing. In our simulation, the average of the simulation probabilitŷ p 1 is asymptotically close to its true proportion p 1 = 0.1, which indicates that the empirical estimatep 1 using classical Warner's RR mechanism Q Y |X is an unbiased estimate of p 1 (Note that the simulation result here is just given in words instead of in figure for simplicity). It can be observed that: (1) The simulation results are consistent with the theoretical values, which verify the correctness and effectiveness of the theoretical derivation in this paper; (2) For a given ε, smaller sample size n leads to higher variance σ 2 . However, higher variance represents lower quality of statistics, because the sample size n at this time is insufficient to offset the positive and negative perturbation noise in the collection data.
Hence, the quality of statistics can be improved by increasing the sample size n for a given ε; (3) For a given n, the variance σ 2 decreases with the increasing ε. In this case, the increase of ε is equivalent to the fact that the power of the perturbation noise added in the noisy channel becomes smaller and smaller, thereby contributing to a higher accuracy of statistics. Therefore, in practice, the quality of statistics can also be improved by increasing ε. In other words, the quality of statistics can be controlled by adjusting ε to achieve a good tradeoff between privacy and quality for a given n. However, increasing the parameter ε will lead to a higher risk of privacy disclosure, which means that the parameter ε cannot be increased without any limitation. As a result, the tradeoff between the sample size n and the parameter ε should be set according to the need of the practical applications.
In order to verify the effectiveness of the lower bound of n for given α, δ, ε, the parameters here are set as α = 0.05, δ = 0.05, that is, the expected statistical estimation result of the experiment satisfies (0.05, 0.05)-accurate (Definition 1). It can be learned from Theorem 1 that given the parameters of α = 0.05, δ = 0.05, the sample sizes required to achieve the required accuracy under four different values ε = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 should satisfy n ≥ 799334, n ≥ 31342, n ≥ 7366 and n ≥ 1499, respectively. For convenience, the lower bound of the sample size n required to achieve the desired (0.05, 0.05)-accurate is denoted as n 0 . Table 1 gives the simulation probabilities of p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 for each ε with three kinds of the sample size: n > n 0 , n = n 0 and n < n 0 , where the lower bounds required to achieve the desired accuracy are shown in italics and the number of Monte Carlo simulations is 10 4 ∼ 10 7 . It can be observed from Table 1 that given any ε, all the simulation probabilities can achieve (0.05, 0.05)-accurate when n ≥ n 0 , i.e., the simulation probabilities satisfy Pr p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 ≤ 0.05. However, the simulation probabilities may fail to achieve the required accuracy when n < n 0 . As a consequence, the experimental results are consistent with the theoretical analysis. On the other hand, the smaller ε is, the larger the sample size n is required to achieve the desired (0.05, 0.05)-accurate, which is also consistent with the theoretical analysis in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Therefore, we can think about practical privacy preservation applications from the following perspectives. First, a smaller ε can be set to reduce the data leakage risk while satisfying the requirement for data quality if n is large enough. Second, a relatively higher ε should be set when there is not enough samples, which means that a certain degree of privacy leakage risk need to be sacrificed in exchange for a higher demand for the quality of statistics. In addition, as can be observed from Table 1 , given the parameter ε, although p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 holds the probability at most 0.05 when n = n 0 , there is such a phenomenon that Pr p 1 − p 1 ≥ 0.05 0.05, indicating that the quality of statistics is high enough at this time. It implies that the theoretical lower bound of n or ε derived from Chebyshev's inequality is quite relaxed (see Appendix A). Thus, the theoretical lower bound can be further optimized in the next step. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the privacy security issues of both the classical RR model proposed by Warner and its extended K -RR model are investigated from the perspectives of privacy and utility. Firstly, the lower bounds of the differential privacy parameter ε and the number of participates n are given for a desired a(α, δ)-accurate. Secondly, given a maximum allowable error probability P max E , the optimal privacy parameters of these three privacy metrics are derived with any prior distribution. Thirdly, a Bayes-based utility function called the correct probability is constructed to measure the degree of privacy leakage, and the accuracy objective of the statistical estimate is considered to derive the range of differential privacy parameter from the perspective of security. Then, we extend all theoretical analyses above to K -RR mechanism. Finally, simulation experiments are given to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the theoretical derivation. Analysis results reveal that the error probability intuitively reflects the data utility is more reasonable as a common criterion to measure the data utility compared to the average distortion. In practice, the discussion and study of privacy parameter settings in the paper have important theoretical significance and practical value for the application of LDPP-RR.
Since we consider the strict ε-differential privacy in the paper, the channel corresponding to the optimal randomized response with differential privacy is symmetric. However, the optimal randomized response channel that is closely related to the prior information may not be symmetric for the relaxed (ε, δ)-differential privacy [29] , [30] . Hence the next step we will examine the relaxed (ε, δ)-differential privacy based on the error probability, and then explore the privacy security issue for Warner's RR model, which will be further extended to K -RR model.
APPENDIX A PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2, AND COROLLARIES 1 AND 2
The paper first theoretically derives the privacy parameters for binary RR model, and further extends it to K -RR model. We know that K -RR model is a generalization of binary RR model, because K -RR mechanism reduces to binary RR model for K = 2. Therefore, the relevant parameters will be derived under the generalized K -RR model in the following section.
For K -RR model, the input private source is x n with x n ∈ D n = {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} n (|D| = K and K ≥ 2). The proportion of x's in the input data x 1 , x 2 ,. . . ,x n is given by
where #(x i = x)∈{0, 1} (i = 1, 2,. . . ,n). The extend K -RR model is described as x n Q Y n |X n − −−− → y n , where x n , y n ∈ D n . Let N x =
